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THE EXHAUSTION OF INTERNAL UNION REMEDIES
AS A PREREQUISITE TO SECTION 301 ACTIONS
AGAINST LABOR UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS
Federal courts' generally have required that a member of a labor
union exhaust 2 internal union remedies 3 before suing a union for
breaching its duty of fair representation.4 They have not, however,
articulated a clear standard for determining when exhaustion is unnec-
essary. 5 Further, the courts have not agreed whether an employer may
be sued for violating a collective bargaining agreement before the em-
ployee has sought relief from within the union.6
All parties involved would benefit from a definite statement as to
when exhaustion is required, although they probably would not agree
on what this policy should be. Employers and labor unions generally
would favor a rule requiring exhaustion when the complaint is against
1. See, e.g., Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974); Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181
(10th Cir. 1973); Bsharah v. Eltra Corp., 394 F.2d 502 (6th Ci. 1968); Kowalski v. Wisconsin Steel
Works, 433 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Mims v. Capitol Printing Ink Co., 428 F. Supp. 12
(D.D.C. 1976); Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1974). But see Cham-
bers v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Petersen v. Rath Packing
Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972).
2. Under the exhaustion doctrine, available non-judicial relief must be sought before a suit
may be brought in the courts. Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, 350 F.2d 1012, 1016 (4th Cir. 1965).
Although the exhaustion requirement may apply to both administrative and collective bargaining
remedies, for purposes of this note the word exhaustion refers only to use of internal union reme-
dies.
3. Internal union remedies are those remedies available to members under the labor union's
constitution and by-laws. Some unions have elaborate procedures culminating in review by im-
partial boards. See Note, Public Review Boards: A Check on Union Disciplinary Powers, 11 STAN.
L. REV. 497 (1959).
4. A union which is an exclusive bargaining agent has a statutory duty to represent its mem-
bers fairly both in collective bargaining with the employer and in enforcing the resulting collective
bargaining agreement. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). This note will not consider the
question of what constitutes a breach of the union's duty of fair representation, but will focus on
when the alleged breach may be challenged in the courts. For a discussion of the duty of fair
representation, see Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionisrm Administrative and Ju-
dicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationshp, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1435 (1963); Cox, Rights Under
a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REv. 601, 645-52 (1956); Murphy, The Duty ofFair Representa-
tion Under Tafi-ltartley, 30 Mo. L. REV. 373 (1965); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective
Agreements andArbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 362, 399-404 (1962); Comment, Federal Protection
of Indvidual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1215, 1232-38 (1964).
5. See notes 45-48 infra and accompanying text.
6. Compare Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977); Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466
F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972); Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972) with Alridge
v. Ludwig-Honold Mfg. Co., 385 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F.
Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Imbrunnone v. Chrysler Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1971);
Harrington v. Chrysler Corp., 303 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
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them since such an approach often would save the expense involved in
a judicial proceeding. Union members, on the other hand, would pre-
fer that there not be an exhaustion requirement. Instead, they would
favor being allowed to decide whether to bring a court action or to seek
relief from within the union.
Convincing arguments exist that the courts have been correct in
more often than not requiring exhaustion before an action can be
brought against a union.7 In contrast, their approach when an em-
ployer is being sued often has been less desirable." The preferable pol-
icy is to apply the same requirement regardless of the identity of the
defendant. 9
This note will examine the question of when internal union reme-
dies must be exhausted before an employee may bring an action under
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.10 First, section 101(a)(4) of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,11 which
provides the statutory basis for an exhaustion requirement, will be dis-
cussed.12 Second, a survey and analysis of how the federal courts have
treated the exhaustion requirement in suits by a union member against
the union for a breach of its duty of fair representation will be
presented. 13 Third, decisions by the courts regarding an employee's
need to exhaust internal union remedies before bringing a section 301
action against an employer for a breach of the collective bargaining
7. See text accompanying notes 37-41 inf'ra.
8. See text accompanying notes 128-84 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 132-40 infra.
10. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). This
statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization rep-
resenting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to citizenship of the parties.
Id. Suits brought in a United States district court pursuant to this statute are commonly referred
to as section 301 actions.
This note will be limited to a discussion of the exhaustion of internal union remedies and
section 301 actions. It will not consider the exhaustion of remedies provided by a collective bar-
gaining agreement. For a discussion of the exhaustion requirement as it applies to collective
bargaining remedies see Simpson & Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and the Individ-
unlEmployee, 51 TEx. L. REv. 1179, 1185-1213 (1973). It also will not consider actions brought
under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970). Cases reaching the United States
courts of appeals under the Railway Labor Act which have involved the exhaustion issue include
Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969)
and Fingar v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 277 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1960).
11. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. §
41 1(a)(4) (1976). See text accompanying note 18 infra for the relevant portion of this statute.
12. See text accompanying notes 16-36 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 45-123 infra.
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agreement will be surveyed. ' 4 Advantages of the various approaches
also will be considered and recommendations will be offered.' 5
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959
The statutory basis for requiring a member of a labor union to
exhaust internal union remedies before suing the union is found in the
proviso 16 included in section 101(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959.17 That statute provides:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to
institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before an adminis-
trative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization
or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such action
or proceeding, or the right of any member of a labor organization to
appear as a witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative pro-
ceeding, or to petition any legislature or to communicate with any
legislator: Provided, That any such member may be required to ex-
haust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month
lapse of time) within such organization. before instituting legal or
administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officers
thereof... 18
Accordingly, a union cannot limit a member's access to administrative
agencies or the courts with one very important exception-the member
may be required to first seek relief from within the union.
The proviso that exhaustion may be required leaves some impor-
tant issues unresolved. First, it does not specify whether it is the union
or the judiciary which can establish the exhaustion requirement. ' 9 Sec-
ond, it is unclear from the language of the statute what constitute "rea-
sonable hearing procedures" and what circumstances will excuse the
exhaustion of internal remedies. The statute states only that the inter-
nal review must be within four months of the alleged injury. Third,
the proviso does not consider whether the member may be required to
exhaust union procedures before bringing a court action against an em-
ployer.
The United States Supreme Court considered both the wording
and purpose of section 10 1(a)(4) in NLRB v. Industrial Union of farine
14. See text accompanying notes 128-31 & 143-94 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 37-44, 124-27, 132-40 & 182-94 infra.
16. A proviso is an exception. Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 435 (1922).
17. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. §
41 l(a)(4) (1976) [hereinafter referred to in the text and footnotes as section 101(a)(4)].
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. See text accompanying note 29 infra for United States Supreme Court dicta regarding
this issue.
CHICAGO-KENT LA4W REVIEW
& Shipbuilding Workers.20  That case originated because a union
member, Edwin D. Holder, had filed a complaint with the National
Labor Relations Board2' alleging that his union22 had discriminated
against him. The union's constitution provided that a member could
appeal an adverse decision of the local executive board at the regular
meeting of the general membership of the local. If dissatisfied with the
decision of the general membership, the member then could appeal to
the general executive board and, finally, to the next national conven-
tion.23 Holder brought his complaint to the NLRB without first ex-
hausting these internal remedies.
The union responded by expelling Holder from the union for ig-
noring the union's exhaustion requirement. 24 Holder appealed his ex-
pulsion to the union's general executive board. After the executive
board affirmed the local's action, he filed a charge with the NLRB.
The NLRB found against the union.25 The matter then went before
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which re-
versed the Board's decision.26 In reviewing this case, the United States
Supreme Court 27 held that a union could not expel a member for filing
a charge with the Board without first exhausting internal remedies if
the complaint does not concern an internal union matter.28
The Supreme Court decision in Marine & Ship building Workers
has significance beyond answering the question of whether a union
may expel a member for failing to exhaust internal union remedies.
This case is important for its dicta that the courts, not the unions, have
the power to determine if exhaustion will be required. 29 Prior to this
decision some courts had stated that such power belonged to the un-
20. 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
21. Hereinafter referred to as the NLRB or the Board.
22. The Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local
22.
23. 391 U.S. at 422-23 n.4.
24. Article V, section 5 of the union's constitution provided that a member "shall exhaust all
remedies and appeals within the Union, provided by this Constitution, before he shall resort to
any court or other tribunal outside of the Union." 391 U.S. at 420-21.
25. 159 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1966). The Board found that the union had violated section
8(b)(l)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(1)(A), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1976). This section of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
to restrain or coerce its employees in exercising their rights under the Act. The Board found that
the union had caused Holder's employer to discriminate against him for his involvement in activi-
ties protected by the Act.
26. 379 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
27. 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
28. Id. at 428.
29. Id. at 426. The Court stated that the section 101(a)(4) proviso means that "the public
tribunals whose aid is invoked may in their discretion stay their hands for four months, while the
aggrieved party seeks relief within the union." Id. (emphasis added).
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ions. 30
Marine & Shipbuilding Workers did not, however, provide a clear
guideline as to when courts should require exhaustion if internal union
affairs are not involved. The Court implied that if strictly internal
matters are in question the member must exhaust available internal
procedures before bringing an administrative or court action against
the union,3' but where the issue "touches part of the public domain"
32
the Douglas majority was less explicit. It merely stated that "a court or
agency might consider whether a particular [internal union] procedure
was reasonable.' 33 The Court did not include a clear answer to what
constitute reasonable review procedures. Although it described the
process available under the constitution of the Industrial Union of
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, 34 it did not explain what makes
these procedures reasonable. 35 Further, the Court did not reach the
issue of whether a member may be required to exhaust internal proce-
dures before bringing a court action against the employer. Since this is
the only United States Supreme Court decision concerning section
101(a)(4), 36 these questions remain without a definitive answer.
THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT AND AN ACTION
AGAINST A LABOR UNION
Several factors favor a policy requiring that a member of a labor
union seek relief from within the union before bringing a court action
against that organization if the complaint can be presented before an
30. See, e.g., Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 702,
708 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 418 (1968); Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626, 306 F.2d 152,
159-60 (3d Cir. 1962).
31. See 391 U.S. at 424.
32. 391 U.S. at 428.
33. Id. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion agreed that the purpose of the proviso in
section 101(a)(4) was to allow a court or administrative agency to decide if exhaustion should be
required, but he did not agree that a union may punish a member for bringing a strictly internal
question before an outside body. Id. at 428-29 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
35. Similarly, in stating "[t]here cannot be any justification to make the public processes wait
until the union member exhausts internal procedures plainly inadequate to deal with all phases of
the complex problem concerning employer, union, and employee member," 391 U.S. at 425, the
Court does not indicate what type of internal procedures are "plainly inadequate."
36. The year after deciding Marine & Shipbuilding Workers the Court considered a case in-
volving exhaustion of contractual and administrative procedures that the complaining employees
alleged would prove "absolutely futile." In Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324
(1969), the Court stated that "the attempt to exhaust contractual remedies.., is easily satisfied by
petitioners' repeated complaints to company and union officials, and no time-consuming formali-
ties should be demanded of them." Id. at 331. Although the issue before the Court in Glover
involved failure to exhaust remedies available under a collective bargaining agreement and
through administrative channels, the Court's holding that exhaustion is not required where it
would be futile arguably is applicable to exhaustion of internal union procedures by analogy.
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impartial body37 and the union's internal procedures are capable of
providing relief.38 First, if impartial internal review is available, a
remedy may be obtained without the expense of court litigation.39
Second, employing internal union review procedures is consistent with
the national policy of encouraging parties to resolve their own dis-
putes.40 Third, if internal relief is available, further burdening the al-
ready overcrowded courts41 will be avoided.
The procedures contained in the constitution of the United Auto
Workers42 are an example of impartial review provided by internal
union regulations. Under the UAW constitution43 a dissatisfied mem-
ber ultimately may appeal to a public review board consisting of "im-
partial persons of good public repute, not working under the
jurisdiction of the UAW or employed by the International Union or
any of its subordinate bodies."44
Typically federal courts have refused to hear breach of fair repre-
sentation cases unless the member had exhausted available intra-union
remedies.45 However, as will be shown in the discussion that follows,
the courts rarely have clearly stated the criteria for determining if ex-
haustion is required and often have not explained the rationale behind
37. A four-month maximum for hearing such complaints is set by statute. See section
101(a)(4) in text accompanying note 18 supra.
38. See text accompanying notes 42-44 ifra.
39. Obviously it is less costly to pursue an internal review than engage in a court contest.
40. See generally Etelson & Smith, Union Discipline Under the Landrum-GriFn Act, 82
HARV. L. REV. 727, 755-56 (1969); Simpson & Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and
the Individual Employee, 51 Tax. L. REV. 1179, 1217-18 (1973); Summers, Legal Limitations on
Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1086-92 (1951). See also Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713,
350 F.2d 1012, 1016 (4th Cir. 1965); Harris v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 321 F.2d 801, 805 (3d
Cir. 1963); Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 364 F. Supp. 302, 306 (D. Del. 1973); Hart v. Local
1292, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiner_ 341 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (D.N.Y. 1972), aft"d, 497 F.2d
401 (2d Cir. 1974); McGraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices, 216 F. Supp. 655, 660
(D. Tenn. 1963), af'd, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965).
41. For a discussion of the judicial caseload see ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS. See also Lasker, The Court Crunch: A View from the
Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245 (1978).
42. Hereinafter referred to as the UAW.
43. UNITED AUTO WORKERS CONSTITUTION, art. 32, as cited in Newgent v. Modine Mfg.
Co., 495 F.2d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 1974).
44. See Parks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963). See also
Note, Judicial Control ofActions of PrivateAssociations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983, 1035 (1963); Note,
Impartial Public Review of Internal Union Disputes: Experiment in Democratic Self-Discipline, 22
OHIO ST. L.J. 64 (1961).
45. See, e.g., Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974); Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181
(10th Cir. 1973); Bsharah v. Eltra Corp., 394 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1968); Kowalski v. Wisconsin Steel
Works, 433 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Mims v. Capitol Printing Ink Co., 428 F. Supp. 12
(D.D.C. 1976); Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1974). But see Cham-
bers v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Petersen v. Rath Packing
Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972).
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their decisions. The typical opinion has relied on words like "ade-
quate,"46 "not futile, ' 47 and "reasonable"48 to describe the types of in-
ternal union procedures which must be exhausted. Nonetheless, close
examination of past decisions reveals that despite the vague language,49
the courts usually have reached the desirable result.5 0 Typically, the
federal courts have forestalled action if internal procedures could pro-
vide an impartial review of the member's complaint within four
months of the alleged injury.
The Language Used by the Courts
No Standard Articulated
The first federal appellate case to consider whether an employee
must exhaust internal union remedies before bringing a section 301 ac-
tion against the union for a breach of its duty of fair representation was
Bsharah v. Eltra Corp. 51 That case involved the Eltra Corporation's
refusal to transfer Jennie Bsharah, an employee, to the factory where
all of the company's operations had been moved. At the time the re-
quest for a transfer was made Bsharah was physically incapacitated
and could not perform her duties.5 2 Bsharah responded to the com-
pany's refusal to transfer her by bringing a court action against the
company and the union. The district court granted the company's and
46. See, e.g., Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974); Retana v. Apart-
ment, Motel, Hotel & Elevator Operators Union, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972); Mines v. Capitol
Printing Ink Co., 428 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1976); Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563
(E.D. Mich. 1974).
47. See, e.g., Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1973); Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel &
Elevator Operators Union, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972); Savel v. Detroit News, 435 F. Supp. 329
(E.D. Mich. 1977); Kowalski v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 433 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Mins v.
Capitol Printing Ink Co., 428 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1976); Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp.
563 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
48. See, e.g., Chambers v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
49. See, e.g., Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974); Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181
(10th Cir. 1973); Bsharah v. Eltra Corp., 394 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1968); Kowalski v. Wisconsin Steel
Works, 433 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Minis v. Capitol Printing Ink Co., 428 F. Supp. 12
(D.D.C. 1976); Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1974). But see Cham-
bers v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Petersen v. Rath Packing
Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972).
50. See text accompanying notes 56, 70-71, 82, 98-100 & 120-25 infra.
51. 394 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1968). In Bsharah both the company and the union were sued, the
company for allegedly breaching the collective bargaining agreement and the union for allegedly
breaching its duty of fair representation. Naming both the employer and labor union as defend-
ants is typical of most actions of this type. In fact, in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), the
United States Supreme Court indicated that an action against an employer could not succeed
unless the complaining member established that the union had breached its duty of fair represen-
tation. See 386 U.S. at 186. See also 386 U.S. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting); Comment, Individual
Control over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.J. 559 (1968).
52. 394 F.2d at 503.
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union's motions for a summary judgment on the grounds that Bsharah
did not follow the contractual grievance procedures and that she did
not attempt to initiate the internal union review procedures provided
by the union's constitution and by-laws.53
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court decision without any explanation. 54 With regard to
the exhaustion of internal union procedures issue, the court merely
stated, "In sustaining the union's motion for summary judgment, the
[trial] court held that, assuming the International Union owed a duty to
protect appellant, she failed to allege or show any attempt to inititate
her intra-union remedies prescribed by the constitution and by-laws of
the International Union and, in this holding, we concur." 5 This state-
ment offered no indication of when exhaustion should be required and
why.
Despite this silence, examination of the facts in Bsharah indicates
that the court was requiring exhaustion under circumstances which
would allow Bsharah to present her case to an impartial tribunal.
Bsharah's union, the UAW, provided a review procedure which could
culminate in a hearing before prominent citizens having no connection
with either the union or company. 56
Must Exhaust Where Internal Remedies Are "Adequate"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit de-
cided the exhaustion issue presented in Newgent v. Modine Manufactur-
ing Co.57 by looking to whether the available union procedures were
adequate.5 8 In that case suit was brought by Donald Newgent, an em-
53. Id.
54. Id. The entire appellate court opinion was only six paragraphs.
55. Id.
56. See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
57. 495 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974).
58. Accord, Mines v. Capitol Printing Ink Co., 428 F. Supp. 12, 13 (D.D.C. 1976); Brookins v.
Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563, 565 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
In Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel & Elevator Operators Union, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir.
1972), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also indicated that the adequacy
of available remedies should be considered in deciding if exhaustion is required. Id. at 1027-28.
In Reana an action had been brought by a hotel maid who alleged that she had been wrongfully
dismissed from her job. The district court dismissed the action for wrongful discharge on the
ground that remedies under the collective bargaining agreement had not been exhausted. The
action for breach of the duty of fair representation was dismissed for want ofjurisdiction. Id. at
1021.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on these
points, but remanded the case for a determination of whether the suit should have been dismissed
because the fired employee had not first exhausted internal union remedies. Specifically, the trial
court was to determine whether the internal remedies were adequate to provide the relief re-
quested and whether there had been a justifiable reason for failing to exhaust. Id. at 1027-28.
The court, in doing so, gave no indication of what makes a procedure adequate.
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ployee who was dismissed from his position at Modine Manufacturing
Company for failing to report to work.59 Newgent's union, United
Auto Workers Local 530, filed a grievance on Newgent's behalf, but
company officials refused to hear it and would not submit the matter to
arbitration on the grounds that the grievance was untimely. 60 The
union president, Robert Hluchan, then told Newgent that further pur-
suit of the grievance would require a lawsuit and that approval of
union membership was necessary if the union were to bring an action
on Newgent's behalf.
According to Newgent, Hluchan advised him that to seek approval
of union members he would have to post a $50,000 bond and that to
take any further internal union steps would be "'senseless and fruit-
less.' ",61 Newgent said Hluchan gave him the union's file of his griev-
ance and advised him to file suit against the union and Modine.62
Newgent admittedly failed to exhaust available internal union reme-
dies before beginning the court action,63 but he defended this failure on
the grounds that he was unaware of the details of the internal appellate
.procedures regarding grievances and that he was relying on Hluchan's
directives.64 Both the district and appellate courts rejected this argu-
ment.6
5
In holding that exhaustion was required, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit employed a two-prong test saying,
in effect, that exhaustion is required if use of internal remedies is
mandatory and the available procedures are adequate.66 The constitu-
tion of the UAW clearly made exhaustion of internal remedies
mandatory before a member could seek judicial or administrative re-
lief.67 With regard to whether the internal procedures were adequate,
59. 495 F.2d at 920-21.
60. Id. at 921-22.
61. Id. at 922.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 927.
64. Id. The court rejected the argument that lack of awareness of internal procedures or
reliance on the statement of a union official excuses failure to resort to the internal review process
before bringing a court action. Id. at 928 (citing Donahue v. Acme Markets, Inc., 54 Lab. Cas.
17,388 (E.D. Pa. 1966)).
65. 495 F.2d at 920.
66. See 495 F.2d at 927. The court stated, "Where ... there is no question as to the ade-
quacy and mandatory nature of the intra-union remedies it is well settled that an exhaustion of the
remedies is an indispensable prerequisite to the institution of a civil action against a union." Id.
67. Article 32, section 13 of the UAW constitution provides:
It shall be the duty of any member.., who feels aggrieved by any action, decision, or
penalty imposed upon him ... to exhaust his... remedy and a appeals therefrom
under the laws of this International Union prior to appealing to a civil court or govern-
mental agency for redress.
495 F.2d at 927.
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the court gave a fairly detailed description of the review procedures
provided under the 1966 UAW constitution. It noted that this constitu-
tion allowed a dissatisfied member to appeal an adverse decision in the
following order: to the membership of the local; to the international
executive board; to the constitutional convention of the international
union; and, finally, in cases where it is alleged that the grievance was
improperly processed because of fraud, discrimination or collusion
with management, to a public review board. 68 The court stated that it
had been judicially recognized that these procedures were "adequate,
fair and reasonable, ' 69 but it failed to explain what makes them so.
Thus, the court did not articulate a meaningful standard for when ex-
haustion is required.
Nonetheless, a careful examination of this case indicates that the
court was, in fact, requiring exhaustion where internal procedures pro-
vided for an appeal to an impartial party. As in Bsharah v. Eltra
Corp. ,70 the action in Newgent was against the UAW, a union affording
dissatisfied members review by an impartial panel.7'
Must Exhaust Where Internal Remedies Are "Not Futile"
Some courts have looked to whether appeal through internal pro-
cedures would be futile when confronted with the question of whether
exhaustion of internal union remedies was required.72 One case de-
cided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, lIrel
v. Zohn Manufacturing Co.,73 involved employees who claimed that
they were being underpaid by the company.74 These employees al-
68. 495 F.2d at 927.
69. Id.
70. 394 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1968). See text accompanying notes 51-56 Supra.
71. See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
72. In addition to the cases discussed herein, see Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel & Eleva-
tor Operators Union, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972); Savel v. Detroit News, 435 F. Supp. 329, 333
(E.D. Mich. 1977); Kowalski v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 433 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. In. 1977); Mins
v. Capitol Printing Ink Co., 428 F. Supp. 12, 13 (D.D.C. 1976); Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F.
Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
Arguably in dicta in Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also used the approach that exhaustion will be
excused if resort to internal remedies would be futile. In that case, the court denied union reli-
ance on an exhaustion defense stating:
Resort to the rank and file under the intra-union appeal procedure presented an unlikely
relief for the plaintiffs. The numerical superionty of men over women at the plant(1,958 to 482), the fact that the issue raised the vulnerability of the men in the "A"jobs
and the opposition of the Union's higher echelon to the women employees' request all
demonstrate that placing the question before the rank and file would have been a losing
gesture.
Id. at 316 (citations omitted). See note 144 infra for a more complete discussion of the facts of this
case.
73. 481 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1973).
74. Id. at 182.
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leged that they had sought to file a grievance through procedures estab-
lished by the collective bargaining agreement but that the union and
employer improperly and unlawfully refused to process it.75 The trial
court granted the union's motion for a summary judgment on the
ground that the employees had failed to exhaust their internal union
remedies. 7 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the district court's summary judgment in favor of the union stating,
"The by-passing of the carefully enunciated review measures, absent a
clear and positive showing offutility, can only promote disharmony in
the field of labor-management relations." 77 Like the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Newgent v. Modine Manu-
facturing Co.,781 the court described the internal review system. The
court noted that a dissatisfied member could appeal first to the local
union, then to a joint board of the region and finally to the national
union. In addition, a member could appeal to the general executive
board of the national without following the intermediate procedures. 79
Use of these internal appeals was required before a member could
bring a court action against the union.80
Imel sought to excuse his failure to follow these procedures on the
ground that the local and joint board had prior knowledge of the com-
plaint.81 The court rejected this excuse because no allegations were
made that the officers of the national had such knowledge and no proof
had been introduced that resort to the national would have been fu-
tile.8 2 This decision would have presented a clear standard for deter-
mining when exhaustion is required if the court had gone on to state
that the availability of review by an impartial panel was the deciding
factor.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Winter v. Local 639, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,83 also looked to whether exhaustion through internal union
remedies would be futile in deciding whether to allow an immediate
court review. Winter involved a seniority dispute in which an em-
ployee, Edward A. Winter, alleged that seniority should have been
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
78. 495 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 57-71 supra.
79. 481 F.2d at 183.
80. Id.
81. Id
82. Id.
83. 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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awarded on a company-wide, rather than plant-wide, basis. In 1971
Winter had filed a grievance on this issue, but after several meetings
with management the union had decided not to pursue the issue. At
this time Winter neither protested nor appealed the union's decision.
Three years later he filed a similar grievance and then failed to attend a
meeting with management which the union had arranged. In light of
Winter's failure to attend the meeting and the fact that this grievance
was really a reinstatement of the earlier complaint, the union decided
not to further process the second grievance.84
The Teamsters' constitution provided several remedies for dissatis-
fied members and required that these be used before the member could
seek relief elsewhere.85 Internal review was available by appealing to
the local executive board, then to the general executive board and
finally to the president of the international union.86 Instead of pursu-
ing these internal remedies, Winter brought a court action. 87
The district court granted a summary judgment to both the union
and the company on the ground that Winter had not exhausted internal
union remedies.8 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit affirmed these summary judgments. 89 In doing so
the appellate court implied 9° that exhaustion of internal union proce-
dures is not a prerequisite to a section 301 action where pursuing them
would be futile.9' The court went on to state that exhaustion is futile if
the internal procedures are inadequate to provide the relief requested,
92
and if union officials are so hostile that the complaining member could
not get a fair hearing. 93 This statement comes closer to presenting a
meaningful test than the language in other opinions.
The statement that internal procedures are futile where the union's
constitution does not provide an "adequate procedural route to the re-
lief requested"94 would be clear were it not for the court's use of the
word adequate. The use of the adjective suggests that the court is say-
84. Id. at 148.
85. Id. at 148-49.
86. Id. at 149.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 148.
89. Id.
90. Although the court does not directly state that a union member need not exhaust internal
union remedies where to do so would be futile, it discussed two reasons why exhaustion could be
futile. Id. at 149-50. In discussing the circumstances under which exhaustion could be futile, the
court implied that where one or both of these situations are present the employee need not resort
to internal procedures.
91. See 569 F.2d at 149.
92. 569 F.2d at 149.
93. Id. at 150.
94. Id. at 149.
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ing, simply, that the procedure must be able to give the member what is
desired. In stating that exhaustion of internal remedies is futile where
"union officials are so hostile to a worker he could not hope to get a fair
hearing regardless of the procedures available," 95 the court considered
how the existence of union hostility might be proven. Such hostility
could either be inferred, the court said, from circumstances surround-
ing the grievance process or established by concrete evidence of per-
sonal animus.96  The main shortcoming with this analysis is that it
failed to recognize that some procedures might afford the member a
fair hearing even if the alleged hostility existed. For example, where
appeal to an impartial party is available, a member has the possibility
of a fair hearing. 97 Nonetheless, the exhaustion test described in the
Winter opinion is a clearer standard than offered in most other deci-
sions.
In Winter the court found that Winter could have obtained some
of the relief he sought through internal union procedures.98 Further,
the court did not find a clear showing of union hostility.99 Conse-
quently, the court concluded that Winter was required to exhaust inter-
nal remedies before suing the union.1°° Since he could receive an
impartial hearing from internal union procedures, immediate judicial
review was unnecessary.
Must Exhaust Where Internal Remedies Are "Reasonable"
Two months after deciding Winter v. Local 639,101 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued an-
other opinion regarding the exhaustion requirement. Chambers v. Lo-
cal 639, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,0 2 like Winter,
involved a seniority dispute. The seniority issue in Chambers was
whether the collective bargaining agreement required merger of the se-
niority lists at two separate plants. The employees bringing the action
95. Id.
96. Id. at 149-50.
97. The constitution of the UAW provides an elaborate internal review system which ulti-
mately allows a dissatisfied member to present a case before a non-partisan panel that has no
connection with the union. UNITED AUTO WORKERS CONSTITUTION, art. 32. See text accompa-
nying notes 42-44 supra. Under a constitution such as this, the member has the possibility of a
fair hearing even if union hostility is present. In discussing the exhaustion requirement for a suit
against the union, the Winter court did not consider the provisions of the UAW constitution. The
court, however, did consider them in discussing the exhaustion of internal union remedies in a suit
against the employer. 569 F.2d at 151 n.26.
98. 569 F.2d at 149.
99. Id. at 149-50.
100. Id. at 150.
101. 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
102. 578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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had been laid off and sought to bump workers with less seniority who
were employed at the second plant.
Although the union appeared to support these employees 0 3 when
they filed their initial grievance, °4 later, at a hearing before the Mary-
land-District of Columbia Joint Area Committee, the union testified
against dovetailed seniority. 0 5 The employees were not notified of
this hearing and did not learn of the result until after they had insti-
tuted the lawsuit" °6
The district court granted summary judgment to the union on the
grounds that internal union remedies had not been exhausted. 107 The
appellate court vacated this decision o8 stating that the "underlying
test '' 09 to determine whether a union member must exhaust internal
union remedies before bringing a section 301 action was whether the
exhaustion requirement was reasonable" ° in light of the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the case."'t In deciding that the facts and cir-
cumstances in Chambers made an exhaustion requirement
unreasonable, the court looked to the merit of the allegation that the
union breached its duty of fair representation,"t 2 the type of internal
review procedures available' 3 and the fact that an employment rela-
tion rather than internal union affairs was in question.' ' 4  The court
concluded that the facts presented a fairly strong claim that the union
breached its duty of fair representation. It noted that the union had
reached a decision adverse to Chambers which the employer was will-
ing to implement and that recourse to internal procedures "could not
conceivably change that opinion."" 5
Consideration of whether a breach of fair representation claim is
meritorious and whether an employment relation rather than internal
union issue is involved are not the proper criteria for determining when
103. Id. at 378.
104. Id. at 377.
105. Id. at 378.
106. Id
107. Id. at 379, 383.
108. Id. at 388.
109. Id. at 386.
110. Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit adopted
the standard used by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine &
Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 428 (1968). See text accompanying notes 20-36 supra. Just
as the Court in Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, the circuit court in Chambers failed to provide a
clear test to determine what would be considered reasonable.
111. 578 F.2d at 388.
112. Id. at 383.
113. Id. at 383-84.
114. Id. at 387.
115. Id.
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exhaustion is reasonable. A purpose of the exhaustion requirement is
to allow a union to rectify its own errors." 6  Where union procedures
provide the member an impartial review, the merits of the fair repre-
sentation claim can be resolved without court interference and should
not be a factor in determining whether exhaustion is reasonable." 7
Consideration of whether an employment relation is involved is not
helpful because situations involving a union's breach of its duty of fair
representation are never strictly internal union matters."18
In looking to the internal union remedies available, the court in
Chambers concluded, "The seniority-roster-merger question has gone
too far, and involves the company too deeply, for the plaintiff-employ-
ees to expect any reasonable chance of relief from subsequent internal
union complaint proceedings." '" 9 Had the court been more precise
about the meaning of "gone too far" and "involves the company too
deeply," a meaningful standard for the exhaustion requirement might
have been the result. As presented, Chambers did not articulate a via-
ble test for determining reasonableness.
In Chambers the court was evaluating the same union provisions
as in Winter 120 but came to a different result. In Winter the court
found that the member could get a fair hearing through the internal
review process,' 2 ' whereas in Chambers it concluded he could not be-
cause of the history of union hostility on the issue.' 22 Whether an im-
partial review was possible was the deciding factor in both cases.' 23
116. See Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, 350 F.2d 1012, 1016 (4th Cir. 1965); Harris v. Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 321 F.2d 801, 805 (3d Cir. 1963); Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 364 F.
Supp. 302, 306 (D. Del. 1973); Hart v. Local 1292, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 341 F.
Supp. 1266, 1270 (D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 497 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1974); McGraw v. United Ass'n of
Journeymen & Apprentices, 216 F. Supp. 655, 660 (D. Tenn. 1963), a 'd, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir.
1965).
117. At the end of the opinion in Chambers the court did state that it was not resolving the fair
representation issue. 578 F.2d at 388.
118. To be a breach of the union's duty of fair representation a party in addition to the union
must be involved.
119. 578 F.2d at 387.
120. 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes 83-100 .supra.
121. Id at 149.
122. 578 F.2d at 387.
123. In Chambers the court stated that whether an employment relation rather than internal
union affairs was being questioned was a factor in its decision that the member need not exhaust
internal union remedies. Id. at 387. The court also considered the merits of the breach of fair
representation claim and the type of union procedures available. Id. at 383-88. Thus, the nature
of the alleged injury was only one of the "facts and circumstances" taken into account. Id. at 386,
388. Further, two months before Chambers, in Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569
F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the same court of appeals held that the union member must exhaust
internal union remedies without considering whether an employment relation was being question-
ed. 569 F.2d at 152. The issue before the court in Winter did involve an employment-related
question. The basis of Winter's complaint was that the union failed to process his grievance
involving seniority determination. 569 F.2d at 148. Despite the statement in Chambers that the
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Recommendations for Future Decisions
Decisions thus far on the exhaustion question do, in fact, make
sense in light of policy considerations. 24 Without clearly explaining
how they have arrived at their holdings, courts have required a mem-
ber to exhaust intra-union procedures where (1) impartial review is
available within four months of the alleged wrong, and (2) the review-
ing panel has the power to provide relief.' 25
In the future, instead of using words such as reasonable, adequate,
and not futile, the courts should clearly set forth these two conditions as
the criteria for when the union member will be required to exhaust
union remedies. If either or both of the prerequisites are lacking, then
the judiciary should allow an immediate section 301 action. 126 The
courts should not concern themselves either with the merits of the em-
ployee's claim against the union for breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation or with the type of grievance involved.127
THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT AND AN ACTION
AGAINST AN EMPLOYER
In contrast to the general consensus among the federal courts that
an employee must exhaust internal union remedies before suing a
union, courts have not agreed whether exhaustion of internal union
remedies is required in order for an action to be brought against an
employer for violating a collective bargaining agreement. 28 Federal
appellate courts generally have used a contract analysis in deciding this
issue.' 29 They have reasoned that an employer who has not entered
into an agreement requiring exhaustion of internal union remedies has
no basis for relying on an exhaustion defense.' 30 Some district courts,
type of issue involved was a factor in determining whether internal remedies must be exhausted,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit does not treat this factor
as decisive.
124. See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 51-123 supra.
126. An alternative to clearer judicial standards is for Congress to pass legislation requiring
exhaustion if review by an impartial party is available.
127. See text accompanying notes 116-18 supra.
128. Compare Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977); Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466
F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972); Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972) with Alridge
v. Ludwig-Honold Mfg. Co., 385 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F.
Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Imbrunnone v. Chrysler Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1971);
Harrington v. Chrysler Corp., 303 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
129. See, e.g., Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977); Orphan v. Furno Constr. Corp., 466
F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972).
130. Sometimes, however, it has been unclear what the appellate courts held or what reason-
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on the other hand, have made the exhaustion defense available to an
employer in the same way it is to a union.' 3'
In light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Vaca v.
S/ves 132 and other general policy considerations, 33 the preferable ap-
proach is to apply the same rules governing a suit against a labor
union 34 when the action is against an employer. In Vaca the Court
indicated that in a section 301 action against an employer for violating
a collective bargaining agreement, it must be established that the union
breached its duty of fair representation. 3 To dismiss an action
against the union 136 but allow it to continue against the employer
places an unfair burden on the employer. If the union will escape lia-
bility it might have no incentive to cooperate with management in es-
tablishing that it did not breach its duty of fair representation. Thus,
the complaining member might be able to present a convincing argu-
ment that the union breached its duty when, in fact, it did not.
Further, if the union will have no liability, collusion between the
union and the member might be encouraged. The member might
agree to sue only the employer in return for union help in establishing
ing they used in deciding this issue. For example, in Bsharah v. Eltra Corp., 394 F.2d 502 (6th
Cir. 1968), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in a six paragraph per curiam
opinion found that the employee had failed to establish exhaustion of internal union remedies and
that "[o]ther contentions advanced by the appellant [the employee] are not meritorious." Id. at
503. The published opinion does not indicate what other points were alleged by the employee.
Therefore, it is uncertain if the court found that the employee must exhaust internal union reme-
dies before bringing suit against the employer. Nevertheless, Bsharah has been cited as support
for the proposition that an employer may rely on an exhaustion defense. See, e.g., Simpson &
Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures ofthe Individual Employee, 51 TEx. L. REv. 1179,
1215 (1973).
In Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel & Elevator Operators Union, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir.
1972), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case because the
record was deemed insufficient to determine whether the internal review procedures could provide
an adequate remedy and whether the employee had a sufficient excuse for failing to exhaust inter-
nal remedies before bringing an action against the union. In dicta the court stated, "Failure to
exhaust internal union remedies could not be urged by the employer as a defense in a suit by the
employee for wrongful discharge," but the court's reasoning behind this statement was not given.
Id. at 1027 n. 16 (citing Brady v. Trans World Airlines, 401 F.2d 87, 102 (3d Cir. 1968)). See note
58 supra for a more complete discussion of the facts of this case.
131. See, e.g., Alridge v. Ludwig-Honold Mfg. Co., 385 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Brook-
ins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Imbrunnone v. Chrysler Corp., 336 F.
Supp. 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Harrington v. Chrysler Corp., 303 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
132. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
133. See text accompanying notes 138-40 infra.
134. See text accompanying notes 37-41 upra.
135. See 386 U.S. at 186. See also 386 U.S. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting); Comment, Individual
Control over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.J. 559 (1968).
136. In some cases only the employer was sued. See, e.g., Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558
F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977); Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972). Bring-
ing an action against only the employer is unfair for the same reasons applicable to a situation
where the union also is named as a defendant and charges against the union are dismissed but the
action is allowed to continue against the employer.
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that there was a breach of the duty of fair representation. Such an
arrangement would benefit the union because it would not have the
potential liablility it would have if it were named as a defendant. The
employee would profit because, with the union's assistance in establish-
ing a breach of the duty of fair representation, a winning case against
the employer might be possible.
In addition to these considerations, general policy arguments ap-
plicable to a suit against a union are relevant to an action against an
employer.137 A policy requiring that internal union procedures be ex-
hausted before a member can turn to the courts for relief is sound be-
cause it may save the expense involved in litigation,138 because it is in
keeping with the national policy of encouraging parties to resolve their
own disputes 39 and because it may avoid further burdening the al-
ready overcrowded courts.14°
Generally the result of appellate court decisions has been consis-
tent with the preferable policy of requiring exhaustion if impartial re-
view is possible under internal union procedures. Even though these
courts, using contract analysis, 41 have allowed an immediate section
301 action, they have only done so in cases where impartial review was
not available through internal procedures. 42 The danger in these ap-
pellate court decisions is that strict application of a contract analysis,
disregarding all other factors, could lead to the wrong result. Under a
per se rule that if the employer has not entered into an agreement with
the employees requiring exhaustion the employer cannot rely on an ex-
haustion defense, the employee might be able to bring a section 301
action despite the existence of internal procedures affording impartial
review.
137. See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
138. See note 39 supra.
139. See generally Etelson & Smith, Union Discpline Under the Landrum-Griffin Act, 82
HARV. L. REV. 727, 755-56 (1969); Simpson & Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and
the Individual Employee, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1179, 1217-18 (1973); Summers, Legal Limitations on
Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REV. 1049, 1086-92 (1951). See also, Simmons v. Avisco, Local
713, 350 F.2d 1012, 1016 (4th Cir. 1965); Harris v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 321 F.2d 801, 805
(3d Cir. 1963); Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 364 F. Supp. 302, 306 (D. Del. 1973); Hart v.
Local 1292, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 341 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd,
497 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1974); McGraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices, 216 F. Supp.
655, 660 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), afd, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965).
140. See note 41 supra.
141. See, e.g., Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977); Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466
F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972).
142. See text accompanying notes 159-63, 171-72 & 179-81 infra.
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The Contract Approach
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Or-
phan v. Furnco Construction Corp. 143 was the first appellate court to
explicitly' 44 apply contract analysis to the question of whether an em-
ployer may rely on an exhaustion defense. In Orphan a class action
was brought against the Furnco Construction Corporation for allegedly
violating the collective bargaining agreement by underpaying the em-
ployees, discriminating against them in hiring and depriving them of
work on certain days.145  The union was not joined as a defendant146
even though establishment of the union's breach of its duty of fair rep-
resentation was necessary for the action against the employer to be suc-
cessful. 147
The district court dismissed the complaint 48 for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted 149 because the employees had
failed to file proper grievances, they had not alleged exhaustion of in-
tra-union remedies, their allegation that the union had breached its
duty of fair representation was facially unsupportable and the union
had the power to screen grievances.' 50 Although the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that the grievances in
question were subject to procedures made exclusive under the con-
tract' 5 and that the union did have the power to screen grievances, 152 it
reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the
facts did not warrant dismissal of the breach of fair representation
claim' 53 and that the employer could not rely on an exhaustion de-
143. 466 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972).
144. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had earlier adopted a similar
approach in Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972). In that case two female
employees alleged that their employer, the Rath Packing Company, had breached the collective
bargaining agreement in failing to reclassify certain jobs, making them available to women and,
alternatively, for failing to assign them to jobs to which they were entitled based on their seniority
and qualifications. An action was also brought against their union, Local 46 of the United Pack-
inghouse, Food and Allied Workers, for failing to adequately process their grievances. The dis-
trict court found these claims to be meritorious. Id. at 314.
In affirming the trial court's decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that the company could not rely on an exhaustion defense because "[tihe question of
exhaustion of internal Union procedures is the Union's concern, not the Company's." Id. at 315.
Although the court did not state that it was employing a contract analysis, such an approach may
be implied from this statement.
145. 466 F.2d at 797.
146. Id. at 796-97.
147. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 181-88 (1967). See text accompanying notes 132-35 supra.
148. 325 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
149. FED. R. CIr. P. 12(b)(6).
150. 325 F. Supp. at 1221-23.
151. 466 F.2d at 798-99.
152. Id. at 802.
153. Id. at 802-04.
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fense. 154
In discussing the exhaustion issue, the appellate court distin-
guished between provisions of a collective bargaining agreement and
procedures which are found in a union's internal by-laws and constitu-
tion. According to the court, an employer may rely on an exhaustion
defense where employees failed to employ provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement but not when the procedures involved are pro-
vided internally by the union. 155 The court found that internal union
procedures require a different result because the employer had not bar-
gained for adherence to union procedures and had no control over
compliance with them. 56
The court went on to say that an employer may use the employee's
failure to exhaust internal union remedies as evidence that the union
had not breached its duty of fair representation. It stated:
All this does not mean that the employer may not raise the
plaintiff's failure to observe the by-law requirement as a defense. It
is clearly entitled to raise that failure as a defense against the plain-
tiff's charge that the Union breached its duty of fair representation, a
charge that the plaintiffs must prove before they can reach the merits
of their breach of contract suit. Certainly the plaintiffs are entitled
to no advantage in this regard, because they failed to join the Union
as a defendant, suing only the employer. If the Union would be
entitled to defend itself on the basis that the plaintiffs did not file
timely and proper grievances so that it was not obligated to take
them up, the employer should be able to advance that same counter
to the plaintiffs' unfair representation claim. 157
This statement that the employee should be given no advantage be-
cause only the employer was sued is correct, but the court's approach
does not solve the problem. If the union is not a defendant, either
because suit was not brought against the union or because the action
against the union was dismissed, an employer's ability to establish that
the union did not breach its duty of fair representation is diminished.158
To avoid placing this unfair disadvantage on an employer, the union
should be joined as a defendant.
The court considered and rejected Furnco Construction Corpora-
tion's argument that allowing it to use an exhaustion defense would
facilitate the national policy favoring arbitration. 159 It gave three rea-
sons for this decision. First, it concluded that the intra-union remedy
154. Id. at 799-802.
155. See 466 F.2d at 799-800.
156. 466 F.2d at 800.
157. Id.
158. See text following note 136 supra.
159. 466 F.2d at 801-02.
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in question was not designed to provide relief to an injured member,
but rather was established to begin a criminal-type prosecution of a
union official accused of wrong-doing. 60 Second, the court did not
find exhaustion of internal union remedies to be mandatory under the
internal union rules. 161 Third, it stated that there was reason to believe
that use of the internal union procedures would be futile.' 62 Thus,
even if the court had applied the same exhaustion requirement gener-
ally used in a suit against a union, 63 exhaustion would not have been
required in Orphan.
Whether the court's response to Furnco's policy argument can be
considered dicta that an employer, under certain circumstances, could
rely on an exhaustion defense even if the employer was not party to an
agreement requiring exhaustion is unclear from the Orphan opinion.
A later case decided by the same court, Harrison v. Chrysler Corp.,164
indicates that the contract analysis was not meant to be a per se rule
that an employer may never rely on an exhaustion defense.
In Harrison an employee, Terrence J. Harrison, had been dis-
charged from his job with the Chrysler Corporation for allegedly falsi-
fying a production count. 65 Harrison attempted to regain his position
through union grievance procedures. Eventually, he was reinstated
but denied back pay. Dissatisfied with this result, he brought suit
against Chrysler.' 66 The district court granted a summary judgment
for Chrysler on the grounds that Harrison had not sought relief
through internal union procedures before suing. 67
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the district court. 68 After repeating the same type of contrac-
tual analysis employed by the court in Orphan, it included dicta
regarding an employer's reliance on an exhaustion defense. The court
stated that where the collective bargaining agreement provides that the
union has the exclusive power to bring an employee's claim, internal
union remedies may be a method by which an employee may insure
fair representation. If internal union procedures could result in a re-
versal of the union's position and a grievance, formerly denied, could
160. Id.
161. Id. at 802.
162. Id.
163. See text accompanying notes 49-123 supra.
164. 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977).
165. Id. at 1275.
166. As in Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972), in Harrison the
union was not named as a defendant.
167. 558 F.2d at 1275.
168. Id.
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be reinstated, the Harrison court indicated it would require the em-
ployee to exhaust internal union remedies before suing the employer
unless use of such internal procedures would be futile. 169
Arguably Harrison represents an expansion rather than abandon-
ment of the contract analysis. The court would allow an employer to
rely on an exhaustion defense only where the employee has an obliga-
tion under the collective bargaining agreement to resort to union re-
view procedures if dissatisfied.17 0 Thus, the employer's contractual
right to rely on an exhaustion defense is found in the collective bar-
gaining agreement.
In Harrison the court found that Chrysler could not rely on an
exhaustion defense because even if Harrison were to win an appeal
within the union, the union did not have the power to reinstate the
grievance.17 1 The complaint already had been reviewed by an appeal
board, 72 and the written decision of this board was binding on all par-
ties. Even if the union were to agree it had not represented Harrison
fairly, it would have been powerless to reinstate the grievance. Not
requiring exhaustion in Harrison makes sense because the internal re-
view procedures could not correct the wrong, not because the contract
analysis mandated this result.
Contract analysis also was used by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In Winter v. Local 63973
the court stated, "[T]he union constitution, which provides for the in-
ternal remedies, is a 'contract' only between the union and its members,
and the employer cannot avail himself of the union's contractual de-
fense."' 74 The court found that the union 75 could rely on an exhaus-
tion defense, 76 but held that the employer could not because he was
not party to the contract between the union and its members.177
The court then went on to consider the implication in Orphan v.
Furnco Construction Corp. '7 8 that under certain circumstances an em-
169. Id. at 1278-80. Judge Fairchild, in a concurring opinion, stated that he "prefer[s] not to
speculate as to whether there are any 'limited circumstances' under which an employer may predi-
cate a defense on the employee's failure to exhaust intraunion remedies." Id. at 1280 (Fairchild,
J., concurring).
170. See 558 F.2d at 1279.
171. 558 F. 2d at 1279.
172. Id.
173. 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes 83-100 supra for a more
complete discussion of this case.
174. 569 F.2d at 150.
175. In Winter, unlike Orphan, both the employer and the union were named as defendants.
176. 569 F.2d at 150. See text accompanying notes 88-100 upra.
177. 569 F.2d at 150-51.
178. 466 F.2d 795, 801-02 (7th Cir. 1972). See text accompanying notes 159-63 supra.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ployer may rely on an exhaustion defense. In concluding that these
conditions were not present in Winter, the court stated:
The procedures at issue here, significantly, are quite similar to those
at issue in Orphan: the Teamsters' constitution liewise provides no
procedures for appealing adverse grievance decisions, but only trial-
type procedures for prosecuting offending union members. Even
under the Orphan dictum, therefore, there is no circuit court author-
ity for making the defense of failure to exhaust union remedies avail-
able to the employer on the facts of this case. 179
This reasoning is inconsistent and troubling. In dismissing the action
against the union because intra-union remedies had not been ex-
hausted, the court had found that pursuit of these remedies would not
be futile. 180 Nevertheless, in considering the employer's possible reli-
ance on the same defense the court concluded that the prospect for re-
lief under the procedures available was sufficiently uncertain to make
the exhaustion defense unavailable.' 81
Under a strict contract analysis there is a per se rule that, unless
the employer had entered into an agreement with the employees that
mandated exhaustion of internal union procedures before a court ac-
tion could be started, an employer can never rely on an exhaustion
defense. A literal application of the contract approach has certain ad-
vantages. If the employer can never claim that an employee's action
must fail because there was not exhaustion of internal union remedies,
all parties involved have the advantage of knowing exactly what the
court will decide. Also, the contract approach can easily be reconciled
with section 101(a)(4).18 2 This statute explicitly states that before suit
may be brought against a union exhaustion of internal union remedies
may be required' 83 but does not specify what is to happen in actions
brought against an employer. Arguably if Congress had intended to
include suits against an employer, it would have drafted a statute ex-
plicitly stating this. Despite these factors, however, applying the same
exhaustion requirement in suits against employers as is used where un-
ions are the defendants is the preferable policy.' 84
179. 569 F.2d at 151.
180. Id. at 149-50.
181, Id. at 150-51. Perhaps this inconsistency is due to the differing relief requested in the
action against Furnco from that in the suit against the union. The published decision is not clear
on this point.
182. See text accompanying note 18 supra for the provisions of section 101(a)(4).
183. See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra for a discussion of section 101(a)(4).
184. See text accompanying notes 132-42 supra.
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The Preferable Approach
Some courts have followed the preferable approach that where the
union is entitled to rely on an exhaustion defense, an action for violat-
ing the collective bargaining agreement cannot be brought against the
employer. For example, in Harrington v. Chrysler Corp. 185 an em-
ployee of the Chrysler Corporation, Edward R. Harrington, alleged
that he had wrongfully been denied seniority rights. The district court
entered a summary judgment for Chrysler Corporation and Harring-
ton's union, Local 412 of the UAW, because Harrington had not ex-
hausted available internal union remedies. 186
The court did not treat the action against Chrysler any differently
than it had the action against the union. The Harrington decision may
be criticized in that the court did not explain its rationale for requiring
exhaustion of internal union remedies before a court action could be
brought against the employer, 18 7 but its result makes sense. The court
did not dismiss the action against only the union and thus leave
Chrysler to defend the charge that the union breached its duty of fair
representation. 88
A later case, Brookins v. Chrysler Corp.,189 held, in effect, that if
the union could rely on an exhaustion defense so could the employer.
Brookins involved the discharge of Willie Brookins from his position
with the Chrysler Corporation. A grievance was filed on Brookins' be-
half, but after the union withdrew it, Brookins sued the union and
Chrysler for breach of the duty of fair representation, breach of con-
tract and fraud. The court awarded summary judgment to the union
and Chrysler because Brookins had failed to exhaust his internal union
remedies. 190
Under the test applied by the Brookins court, whether an employer
can rely on an exhaustion defense turns on whether the merits of the
breach of fair representation claim have been determined. If the union
was successful in defending itself because it had not yet breached its
185. 303 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
186. Id. at 497.
187. See also Alridge v. Ludwig-Honold Mfg. Co., 385 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Inbrun-
none v. Chrysler Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1971). But see Anderson v. Ford Motor
Co., 319 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Mich. 1970) (where the action against the union was dismissed for
failure to exhaust internal union remedies but the action against the employer was dismissed on
the merits).
188. This approach eliminates the unfairness to the employer of having to establish that the
union did not breach its duty of fair representation under circumstances where the union has no
liability. See text accompanying notes 132-37 supra.
189. 381 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
190. Id. at 569.
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duty of fair representation, the action against the employer would be
dismissed because the union member had failed to exhaust internal
union remedies. On the other hand, if the court recognizes that a
breach may have occurred and dismisses the suit against the union only
because no judicial remedies are available, the employer could not rely
on an exhaustion defense. 191
In putting forth this test, the Brookins court took the position that
a union's breach of fair representation cannot be proven until it is
shown that the member unsuccessfully exhausted all internal review
procedures. The court's rationale was that if use of internal union
remedies could reverse a union's incorrect behavior, the employee
could not establish that the union breached its duty of fair representa-
tion. Because an employee cannot sue an employer for violating the
collective bargaining agreement unless it can be shown that the union
breached its duty of fair representation, 92 the court's analysis in
Brookins is sound. An employer should not be forced to defend itself
by establishing that the union did not breach its duty of fair representa-
tion if the union is not also a defendant. 93 Where internal review by
an impartial panel with the power to change the result is available and
the union, consequently, cannot be sued until such remedies are ex-
hausted, 94 the action should not be allowed to proceed only against the
employer.
CONCLUSION
A review of decisions by the federal courts on whether a union
member must exhaust internal union remedies before bringing a sec-
tion 301 action against a union or employer reveals that the courts have
not always articulated the best approach for determining the answer.
The decisions concerning exhaustion of union procedures before suit is
brought against the union have had the correct result but their analysis
has been weak. Where suits against employers have been in question,
the courts have often applied a contract analysis when the better ap-
proach would have been to state that the employee must first seek relief
under internal union procedures if review is possible by an impartial
party with the power to change the result.
Public policy considerations favor applying the same exhaustion
standards to suits against both union and employer. By requiring the
191. Id. at 567-68.
192. 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). See text accompanying note 135 supra.
193. See text accompanying notes 136-37 supra.
194. See text accompanying notes 51-125 supra.
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employee to exhaust internal union remedies if internal rules provide a
hearing by an impartial body which has power to rectify any wrong,
the employer will not be denied due process, and collusion between the
union and its members will not be encouraged. In addition, union de-
mocracy will be furthered, unnecessary expense will be avoided and the
already overcrowded court docket will not be further clogged with un-
necessary litigation.
Although the current statute provides that an employee may have
to exhaust internal union remedies before bringing a court action
against the union, no such provision expressly exists for an action
against an employer. The law should be rewritten to require exhaus-
tion of internal union procedures as a prerequisite to a section 301 ac-
tion against a union for a breach of its duty of fair representation and
against an employer for breach of contract where review is available by
an impartial body with the power to change the result. A law drafted
in this way would eliminate all uncertainty. However, if congressional
action on this matter is not forthcoming, courts can find the basis for
requiring exhaustion in section 101(a)(4) and justify such a finding by
public policy considerations.
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